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AUTHORIZING CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT: 
ON THE PURPORTED TWENTY-
SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Sanford Levinson* 
This essay began as a teaching exercise for my first-year class 
on constitutional law; a version of it begins the 1993 Supplement 
to Paul Brest and Sanford Levinson, Processes of Constitutional 
Decisionmaking. The "27th Amendment" is a veritable godsend 
to all professors who focus on basic theories of constitutional 
interpretation, and I hope that the discussion below will be peda-
gogically useful. The uncertain status of the Amendment, how-
ever, also raises in an almost pure form the question of the role 
of the constitutional law professor as a possible "creator" (or at 
least partner in the creation) of the Constitution, which is the 
subject of the concluding section of this essay. 
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE OSTENSIBLE 
27TH AMENDMENT 
Every casebook on constitutional law, not surprisingly, re-
prints the "Constitution of the United States." Some do it at the 
beginning of the text;t others put it at the end.z Whatever de-
bates might be taking place about the "canon" within the field of 
American constitutionallaw,3 all apparently agree that the text 
of Constitution itself is part of the canon.4 So much is un-
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Regents Chair in Law, Uni-
versity of Texas Law School. 
1. See, e.g., William Cohen and Jonathan D. Varat, Constitutional Law: Cases and 
Materials 2-16 (Foundation Press, 9th ed. 1993). 
2. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey, Con-
stitutional Law: Themes for the Constitution's Third Century, Appendix I (West Pub. Co., 
1993). 
3. See Sanford Levinson, Slavery in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 68 Chi. Kent 
L. Rev. 1087 (1993). 
4. Though it would be an interesting question to examine as an empirical matter 
what aspects of the text are in fact taught or ignored by the bulk of the teaching professo-
riate. How many of us, for example, take the time to teach Article VII, which raises basic 
questions about the foundation of the Constitution? Also, as I learned several years ago 
in a visit to China, the Twenty-Second Amendment, with its two-term limitation in regard 
to the presidency, is of great interest to the Chinese. I confessed that I had never actually 
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problematic. But is it equally unproblematic what constitutes the 
canonical textual "Constitution" itself that is to be reprinted? At 
least at the present time, the answer, I suggest, is no. The reason 
for this surprising (or, for some, perhaps astounding and incom-
prehensible) statement is the controversy over the status of the 
purported Twenty-Seventh Amendment, which reads, "No law, 
varying the compensation for the services of Senators and Repre-
sentatives, shall take effect, until an election for Representatives 
shall have intervened. "s 
The controversy surrounding the "27th Amendment" de-
rives from the fact that it was initially proposed as the "second 
amendment" of the twelve sent by the First Congress to the 
states in 1789. It obviously was not ratified by the requisite 
number of nine states at that time,6 though it was ratified by six 
states prior to 1800. It did not have a deadline for ratification; 
indeed, a seventh state ratified the Amendment in 1873. "Redis-
covered" in the late 1970s by a student at the University of Texas, 
it was brought up in many state legislatures. Beginning with Wy-
oming's ratification on March 3, 1978, it was ratified by 32 states 
thereafter, with Michigan, on May 7, 1992, becoming the 38th 
state to ratify the 1789 proposal. A flurry of newspaper stories 
brought the Amendment, and questions about its status, to pub-
lic attention. Several major members of Congress indicated their 
"taught" the Amendment in my constitutional law courses, given that there is in fact no 
controversy about its meaning. At another level entirely, the "counterfeiting clause" of 
Article I, § 8, raises extraordinarily interesting questions about constitutional interpreta-
tion, including the possibility that the national government is without power to criminal-
ize anything else than counterfeiting, piracy, and treason. See the wonderful article by 
William Van Alstyne, Dual Sovereignty, Federalism and National Criminal Law: Modern-
ist Constitutional Doctrine and the Nonrole of the Supreme Court, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 
1737 (1989). In any event, what might be termed the "operative canon" of the constitu-
tional text is surely more limited than the entire text reprinted in the casebooks. 
5. See Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 497 (1992). Many of the theoretical 
issues considered in this essay are also discussed in Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General 
Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 
Yale L.J. 677 (1993). Lawrence Lessig refers to "the (what ought to be) questionable 
status of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment" in Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Texas L. 
Rev. 1165, 1168 n.14 (1993). See also Ruth Ann Strickland, The Twenty-Seventh Amend-
ment and Constitutional Change by Stealth, 26 PS: Political Science & Politics 716 (1993). 
6. Rhode Island did not ratify the Constitution, and therefore become a part of the 
United States of America, until May 29, 1790. See U.S.C.A., Constitution, Arts. 2-7 at 
673 (West Pub. Co., 1987). Until that time, then, I presume that it would have taken only 
nine of the existing twelve states to ratify the amendments and make them part of the 
Constitution. Upon Rhode Island's joining, the number became 10. By 1992, of course, 
the constitutionally required number was three-quarters of 50, or 38. Should the District 
of Columbia (or Puerto Rico) ever become a state, then the number presumably would 
rise to 39. 
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doubts about the circumstances of "ratification," and it appeared 
that a legislative debate would ensue. 
Some legal commentators suggested that the Amendment 
had "died" in the two hundred years between its first and final 
ratifications. They emphasized in particular the Supreme Court's 
assertion-in dicta, to be sure-in a 1921 case, Dillon v. Gloss, 7 
which involved the then unprecedented placement by Congress 
of a seven-year time limit for the ratification of the Eighteenth 
Amendment imposing prohibition on the nation. A unanimous 
Court, through Justice Van Devanter, indicated that it found 
nothing in Article V "suggest[ing] that an amendment once pro-
posed is to be open to ratification for all time, or that ratification 
in some of the States may be separated from that in others by 
many years and yet be effective." Indeed, said the Court, there is 
much "which strongly suggests the contrary." For example, con-
gressional proposal and state ratification "are not treated as un-
related acts but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the 
natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated 
in time." Moreover, the very process of amendment itself is pre-
sumably triggered by a perception of "necessity" in regard to the 
topic of amendment, "the reasonable implications being that 
when proposed they are to be considered and disposed of 
presently." 
Perhaps most important, though, is the third reason given by 
the court, the ostensible requirement of ratification "sufficiently 
contemporaneous in that number of States to reflect the will of 
the people in all sections at relatively the same period, which of 
course ratification scattered through a long series of years would 
not do." Van Devanter quoted John Jameson's leading text on 
the Constitutional Convention for the proposition "'that an al-
teration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the 
sentiment and the felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified 
early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist, it 
ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, 
unless a second time proposed by Congress.' " 
Indeed, the Court noted that the question of time limits for 
ratification was not entirely abstract or hypothetical, for it 
pointed out that rejection of the "contemporaneous ratification" 
requirement would lead to the conclusion that "four amend-
ments proposed long ago-two in 1789, one in 1810 and one in 
1861-are still pending." It therefore went on to offer an advi-
sory opinion that "it is quite untenable" to believe that they 
7. 256 u.s. 368 (1921). 
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could now be added to the Constitution after the passage of so 
many years since congressional proposal. The Court concluded 
"that the fair inference or implications from Article V is that the 
ratification must be within some reasonable time after the 
proposal."s 
Citing Dillon, among other authorities, Yale professor Paul 
Gewirtz wrote a lettef9 to Illinois Senator Paul Simon advising 
that "by concurrent resolution Congress 
-formally decline to proclaim the amendment as a ratified 
part of the Constitution; but 
-send the amendment back out to the states for ratification 
with an explicit ratification period of 7 years." 
Professor Gewirtz admitted that Article V is silent about 
time limits, but he noted that "[i]n law, virtually all documents 
are interpreted to contain an implicit reasonable time period. 
For example, when you extend an offer to someone to enter a 
contract, such offers are interpreted to be open only for a 'rea-
sonable' time period, even in the absence of any explicit time 
restrictions." He argued that it was especially important to read 
a "reasonable time" limitation into Article V: "The point of 
sending an amendment to the states for ratification is to test 
whether there is a broad consensus in support of the amendment. 
Only if the amendment is ratified within a generation or less can 
we be confident that a consensus has existed at a particular point 
in time." 
Other commentators endorsed the suggestion that, at the 
least, Congress hold formal hearings about the provenance of the 
"27th Amendment" and come to some conclusion about the is-
sue, whether it be to agree with Professor Gewirtz and formally 
repropose it for new ratifications or to "declare" that the 1789 
proposal had been truly ratified. Indeed, Professor Gewirtz 
wrote Senator Simon that "Congress clearly has the power" to 
decide "whether ratification has occurred within a reasonable pe-
riod of time," citing Coleman v. Miller.to That case dealt with the 
ratification process in regard to a Child Labor amendment pro-
posed in 1924, without a time limit for ratification, and ostensibly 
ratified by the Kansas legislature in 1937. The Court, through 
Chief Justice Hughes, referred to a congressional authority to 
"promulgate" amendments-i.e., to declare them ratified-and 
8. ld. at 374-75. 
9. Which he was kind enough to share with me. 
10. 307 u.s. 433 (1939). 
1994] TWENTY-SEVENTH AMENDMENT 105 
went on to state that Congress "in controlling the promulgation 
of the adoption of a constitutional amendment has the final de-
termination of the question whether by lapse of time its proposal 
of the amendment had lost its vitality prior to the required ratifi-
cations."ll Justice Black, writing for a group of four Justices, 
stated with remarkable extravagance that "Congress has sole and 
complete control over the amending process,"tz including the 
power to determine if an amendment "must die unless ratified 
within a 'reasonable time.' "13 There is, of course, no textual war-
rant whatsoever for the "promulgatory" function of Congress, let 
alone for the finality placed in Congress, a fact that seemed not 
at all to perturb the Justice who would in the course of his career 
become the greatest (and certainly most insistent) textualist in 
the history of the Supreme Court. 
Arguments like Professor Gewirtz's were answered in the 
Wall Street Journal by Harvard professor Laurence Tribe,t4 who 
presumably startled at least some of both his admirers and de-
tractors by taking up the cudgels for a textualism that the later 
Black could well be proud of. 
Article V says an amendment "shall be valid to all Intents and 
Purposes, as part of this Constitution" when "ratified" by 
three-fourths of the states-not that it might face a veto for 
tardiness. Despite the Supreme Court's suggestion, no speedy 
ratification rule may be extracted from Article V's text, struc-
ture or history. 
Tribe pointed to several "mysteries" that an inference of lim-
ited time for ratification would create, beginning with one "that a 
society profoundly divided over questions of when human life 
begins and ends should grasp quite readily: What would be satis-
factory criteria for constitutional 'life' and 'death?'" It is not 
clear, for example, that an amendment added as the result of a 
"political wildfire that sweeps the nation and then burns itself 
out"-consider, for example, the proposed flag-burning amend-
ment of several years ago-would represent a greater consensus 
"than a ratification trajectory spanning the centuries and repre-
senting a considered judgment across generations." Moreover, 
there are obvious problems of deciding whom to trust as the con-
sensus recognizer. Does it make any sense to allocate such a role 
11. Id. at 456. 
12. Id. at 459. 
13. Id. at 458. 
14. Lawrence Tribe, The 27th Amendment Joins the Constitution, Wall Street Jour-
nal, May 13, 1992, at A15. 
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to the National Archivist, who by statute must certify and publish 
ratified amendments?ts As for Gewirtz's (and Black's) sugges-
tion that Congress should play that role, Tribe answers that "the 
102nd Congress ... has an ax to grind regarding midterm pay 
raises" and is therefore "a dubious repository of power to veto 
ratifications." 
For Tribe, Congress's role in the amendment process is lim-
ited to its Article V role of choosing a particular amendment pro-
cess-ratification by legislatures or by special conventions-and 
to an authority given it by the Necessary and Proper Clause of 
Article I to include ratification deadlines in the amendments it 
proposes. Referring to the extension of the time for ratification 
in regard to the ill-fated Equal Rights Amendment, Tribe adds 
that Congress "might even be able to make midcourse adjust-
ments by adding time limits to still pending amendments that 
lacked them originally."t6 But Congress has no further "post-hoc 
role in evaluating constitutional ratifications. It is not Congress's 
role to declare Michigan's 1992 ratification of the 27th amend-
ment too recent or Maryland's 1789 ratification too ancient." He 
thus derided the proposal, endorsed by the editors of the New 
York Times among others, that the amendment be returned to 
the eight states that ratified it before 1980 for re-ratification, 
which would presumably cure the taint of lack of con-
temporanity. "[W]hat," he bitingly asked, "would they be ratify-
ing anyway? A dead amendment that Congress has not 
reproposed? And if the amendment is not 'dead,' why are the 
earlier ratifications moribund?" 
As it turns out, "Congress ... rushed to bless the 27th 
Amendment to the Constitution with near unanimity."t7 With-
out holding a single day of hearings or, so far as one can tell, a 
serious debate on the issue, both the House and the Senate on 
May 20, 1992, pronounced the amendment to be "valid ... as 
part of the Constitution of the United States" by votes of 414-3 
15. See 1 U.S.C. § 106b (1988): 
Whenever official notice is received at the National Archives and Records Ad-
ministration that any amendment proposed to the Constitution of the United 
States has been adopted, according to the provisions of the Constitution, the 
Archivist of the United States shall forthwith cause the amendment to be pub-
lished with his certificate, specifying the States by which the same may have 
been ~dopted, and that the same has become valid, to all intents and purposes, 
as a part of the Constitution of the United States. 
16. Emphasis added. One wonders if Professor Tribe really means to say that C:on-
gress only "might" have this power, which woul.d entail. that perh~ps t~e conservatives 
were right after all in suggesting that the extension of time for ratification of the ERA 
was unconstitutional. 
17. Unfinished Constitutional Business, N.Y. Times, May 24, 1992, § 4, at 10. 
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and 99-0, respectively. As described by a reporter for the New 
York Times: 
Congressional leaders' early assertion that the House and the 
Senate would make the final decision on the validity of the 
pay-raise amendment had long since faded by the time both 
houses voted today. The issue had simply dried up in an envi-
ronment of public anger over Congressional perquisites and 
pay raises, and as a result today's votes were regarded as en-
tirely political, giving members a chance to be on record as in 
favor of the amendment.ts 
Interestingly enough, though, the Times article quoted ear-
lier includes the sentence that "[t]he votes today came 24 hours 
after the 27th Amendment to the Constitution had already been 
made the law of the land with its publication in the Federal Reg-
ister by Don W. Wilson, Archivist of the United States." (In-
deed, Mr. Wilson had announced on May 13 that he would in fact 
certify the adoption of the amendment.) Lest we think that the 
legally untrained Mr. Wilson engaged in his independent analy-
sis,19 he in fact acted under the warrant of an opinion drafted 
within the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice.zo Pointing to the existence within the text of the 
Constitution of a number of explicit time limits,21 the memoran-
dum argued that "[i]f the Framers had contemplated some termi-
nus of the period for ratification of amendments generally, they 
would have so stated."zz It also noted the special desirability that 
the procedures of constitutional amendment "must provide [clear 
rules] capable of mechanical application."z3 To put it mildly, a 
rule of "reasonableness" as to duration of time for ratification or 
18. Richard Berke, Congress Backs 27th Amendment, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1992, at 
26A. 
19. Which I would not at all condemn him for doing, especially in regard to constitu-
tional interpretation. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton U. Press, 
1988). 
20. See 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 100, 100-36 (1992) (preliminary print). 
21. Although the opinion points to such limitations as those regarding the terms of 
various offices, surely its strongest examples are those involving the ten-day limit on pres-
idential vetoes, article I, § 7 and, within Article V itself, the provision preventing congres-
sional abolition of the international slave trade until 1808. See id. at 104. 
22. Id. at 104. 
23. Id. at 113. One of the citations offered for this proposition was an article by 
then-Professor Walter Dellinger, who is now the head of the Office of Legal Counsel in 
the Clinton Administration. See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional 
Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 386, 418 (1983): 
"Attention to th[e] formalities [specified in Article V] is more likely to provide clear 
answers than is a search for the result that best advances an imputed 'policy' of 'contem-
poraneous consensus."' The memorandum notes, however, that Dellinger had suggested 
that the proposed pay-raise amendment had in fact "died" at some point because of the 
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ascertainment of a suitable "contemporaneous consensus" does 
not count for most analysts as a sufficiently clear rule. 
The OLC memorandum also skewered the notion that Con-
gress had any role to play as an ultimate "promulgator" of pro-
posed and ratified constitutional amendments.z4 There is only 
one example of such "promulgation" in our history, concerning 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and it is described, and dismissed, 
by the OLC as "merely an aberration."zs This explains not only 
why the Archivist declared that a new amendment had entered 
the Constitution, but also why he felt under no duty at all to wait 
for the Congress to weigh in with a view on the matter. 
No case law offers any judicial opinions as to the propriety 
of the process by which the Twenty-Seventh Amendment ostensi-
bly joined the Constitution. One case was filed,z6 subsequent to 
the certification of the amendment, challenging the constitution-
ality of certain automatic cost-of-living pay raises provided by the 
Ethics Reform of Act of 1989, but the district court avoided any 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment questions by noting that an elec-
tion had in fact intervened since passage of the challenged pay 
raises. Moreover, it questioned whether the Amendment would 
have retroactive application to legislation passed before its ratifi-
cation. Although an amicus brief apparently raised the issue of 
the Amendment's validity, none of the parties did; in any event, 
the court, no doubt properly, declined to reach out and address 
an issue that it deemed irrelevant to the case before it. 
II. THE ROLE OF THE LEGAL ACADEMIC AS 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETER AND 
CONSTITUTION-CREATOR 
I have just described where "the law of the 27th amend-
ment" stands as of this writing (September, 1993). Or perhaps I 
should say where the law, as conventionally defined, stands. In 
the remainder of this essay, I want to address the possibility-! 
would argue reality-of the legal academics' role in serving as 
self-conscious legal decisionmakers. The issue is presented most 
clearly to those of us who have chosen to present casebooks on 
constitutional law for use by our colleagues in their classrooms. 
What should we do, when preparing our new editions or our sup-
many years that went by without any state debate or ratification at all. See 16 Op. Off. 
Legal Counsel at 113 n.14 (cited in note 20). 
24. See id. at 118-26. 
25. Id. at 126. 
26. Boehner v. Anderson, 809 F. Supp. 138 (D. D.C. 1992) 
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plements to present editions, in regard to adding the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment to the text of the Constitution that is found 
at the beginning (or end) of the casebook? Should the relevant 
sentence about congressional salaries simply be reprinted as 
"Amendment XXVII"? Or, if one agrees with Professor Gewirtz 
(among others), should that sentence be omitted, because it is 
not "really" anything we should call a constitutional 
amendment? 
There is a third alternative: Duke law professor William Van 
Alstyne, in the supplement to his own casebook on the First 
Amendment, prints the purported Amendment with an asterisk, 
followed by a discussion of its provenance.27 According to Van 
27. William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment: Cases and Materials vii (Foundation 
Press, Supp. 1992). An asterisk seems to be the preferred solution among editors of con-
stitutional law casebooks who have published texts or supplements since May 1992. See 
William B. Lockhart, Yale Kamisar, Jesse H. Choper, and Steven H. Shiffrin, Constitu-
tional Law, The American Constitution, Constitutional Rights and Liberties 187 (West Pub. 
Co., 7th ed. Supp. 1992). "Amendment XXVII [?]*" What follows is a relatively brief 
footnote concluding with, "After all this time, is the ratification of the 1\venty-Seventh 
Amendment valid? Does it matter that many of the states that ratified the Amendment 
did not exist at the time it was first proposed?" Fred Schauer also uses an asterisk to 
signal a long footnote in his Supplement to Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law and Indi-
vidual Rights in Constitutional Law 212 (Foundation Press, 12th ed. Supp. 1992). I might 
note at this point the observation of my irreverent colleague Scot Powe that the use of the 
asterisk to place into question the status of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment is reminis-
cent of baseball commissioner Ford Frick's decision to order that an asterisk accompany 
the listing of Roger Maris's 61 home runs as the record for one season, given that his 
season was eight games longer than the 154-game season played by Babe Ruth. 
There is no asterisk in the Supplement to Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass 
R. Sunstein, and Mark V. Thshnet 1 (Little, Brown and Co., 1993), but students are di-
rected to a three-paragraph discussion of the episode at p. 22. The second paragraph 
begins, "Is the amendment now part of the Constitution?" The most extensive discussion 
can be found in Cohen and Varat, Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials (cited in note 
1). A brief footnote following the text of "Amendment XXVII [1992]," sketches its his-
tory. ld. at 16. More importantly, students are directed to a four-paragraph discussion of 
the amendment that concludes a four page "digression" on "the amendment process" 
more generally. Id. at 146-50. Cohen and Varat focus particularly on the whether ques-
tions raised by the Article V amendment process, including that which generated the 
purported 1\venty-Seventh Amendment, are justiciable. Thus they conclude the section 
with the question, "Was it inappropriate for the Court in Dillon to adjudicate the issue 
whether Article V implicitly requires ratification within a reasonable time?'' ld. at 150. 
1\vo other casebooks published since 1992 are Ronald D. Rotunda, Modem Constitu-
tional Law: Cases and Notes (West Pub. Co., 4th ed. 1993) and Farber et al., Constitutional 
Law: Themes for the Constitution's Third Century (cited in note 1). Rotunda includes 
brief "historical notes" after the text of each amendment. Although the note following 
the text of "Amendment [XXVII][1992]" (the standard form used by Rotunda in regard 
to the listing of amendments) includes reference to the fact that the period of ratification 
extended from 1789 to 1992, there is otherwise no indication that it is problematic. Ro-
tunda, Modern Constitutional Law: Cases and Notes at lxv. Farber et al., at Appendix 1, 
page [18], reprint "Amendment XXVII [1992]," though a footnote directs students to 
"questions about the validity of the ratification of this amendment" at p. 1044 of their 
casebook. There students will read of the now "new[?]" amendment and its unusual 
provenance, and they are asked if "the original second amendment [is] now a valid 
110 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:101 
Alstyne,zs his placing of the asterisk 
is just a personal way of coping with the headache I've been 
unable to overcome in thinking about Congress and how it 
sometimes behaves in matters of constitutional law . 
. . . . Dillon v. Gloss provided the Supreme Court's con-
sidered view of what Article V requires in order that an altera-
tion or addition to the Constitution be deemed to satisfy the 
Constitution. It is also a compelling view, and it was 
measuredly ventured in a wholly noninflammatory way by a 
unanimous Supreme Court, a Court including Holmes, Bran-
deis, and Edward White, the Chief Justice of the United 
States. One might suppose Congress would provide good rea-
son to suggest why it is not sound, if indeed it is not. 
.... Does Congress actually believe the contrary, more-
over, or is it that Congress doesn't actually have a belief at all? 
.... The view from Durham ... , for whatever its worth, is to 
see Congress as through a glass, darkly, in the annals of its 
treatment of our constitutional law. 
It is worth noting that Van Alstyne's dismay about Con-
gress's performance presupposes that it had a constitutional role 
to perform at all. If, however, the OLC is correct, then Congress' 
response is wholly irrelevant. At that point, of course, Van 
Alstyne might shift his concern to the performance of the OLC. 
In any event, Van Alstyne's decision, and its defense by reference 
to "what one thinks one owes to others just as a teacher," sug-
gests yet a fourth possibility, to print it, and any other similarly 
problematic amendments, with asterisks and discussions. Surely 
the most important additional candidate for an asterisk is the 
Fourteenth, proposed by what Bruce Ackerman has called a 
"rump" Congress that excluded representatives and senators 
elected by "state" legislatures and electorates recognized as legit-
imate by the President of the United States (and who had been 
counted in the array of states ratifying in 1865 the Thirteenth 
Amendment, abolishing slavery). In turn, when several of these 
"states" rejected the proposed amendment, Congress imposed 
military "reconstruction" of the "state" structures of governance 
and, further, required, as a condition of "readmission" of elected 
Twenty-Seventh Amendment? Should anybody else get to consider this question now 
that Congress has accepted it?" Id. at 1045. 
As already indicated, much of this article, in a somewhat different form, appears at 
the beginning of the 1993 Supplement to Brest and Levinson. I anticipate that our discus-
sion will be (and will likely remain) by far the longest found in the casebook literature. 
28. William Van Alstyne, What Do You Think About the Twenty-Seventh Amend-
ment?, 10 Duke Law Magazine (1992), reprinted in 10 Const. Comm. 9 (1993). 
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Senators and Representatives to Congress, the ratification of the 
Amendment by the legislatures of the affected "states. "29 
Among other things, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment 
raises serious questions as to what counts as comprising "two 
thirds of both Houses" or "three fourths of the several States" 
whose concurrence is necessary (or at least sufficient), under Ar-
ticle V of the Constitution, to "amend" the Constitution. Doug-
las Laycock has written that "the Reconstruction Congresses 
accomplished a true revolution-a fundamental change in favor 
of liberty, achieved by force of arms because it could not be 
achieved within the voting rules created by the original Constitu-
tion. Revolutions by definition violate positive law ... "3o 
Professor Walter Dellinger has suggested that the extreme-
and altogether questionable-assertion by Justice Black in Cole-
man that Congress enjoys plenary, i.e., unreviewable, power to 
decide on the validity or invalidity of proposed amendments 
came from his desire to leave buried in history any question 
about the legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment, an issue 
never seriously discussed by the Supreme Court. Black, an 
Alabaman, was deeply conscious of the critique of the Amend-
ment's provenance and may have doubted the Court's ability to 
answer it successfully had the Justices ever been forced to engage 
in a full-scale review of the events of 1866-1868. Black later 
wrote, in a case dealing with the power of Congress to require 
state courts to exercise jurisdiction in cases arising under federal 
statutes, that "the fundamental issues over the extent of federal 
supremacy had been resolved by war."31 Any student of consti-
tutional interpretation should certainly reflect long and hard on 
Black's assertion, as well as on the fact that we so rarely explicitly 
address its implications in our courses on constitutional law and 
constitutional change. 
Classroom presentation of the controversy about the status 
of the "Twenty-Seventh Amendment," especially if coupled by 
any expression of a professorial point of view as to its validity, 
highlights what has always been the somewhat peculiar role 
played by law professors in regard to the materials that they 
teach. Few professors are content to play the role of detached 
29. See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale L.J. 
453, 500-07 {1989). Ackerman's very important general theory defending the legitimacy 
of the Fourteenth Amendment (as a non-Article V amendment of the Constitution) is 
laid out in Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations (Harv. U. Press, 1991). 
30. Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of Federal 
Power, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 Yale L.J. 1711, 1729 {1990). 
31. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390 {1947). 
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presenters, without views of their own, regarding cases, presiden-
tial messages, views of other scholars, or whatever else may 
count as possible views of the Constitution. Instead, most profes-
sors profess: for better or worse, they succumb to the temptation 
of registering their own views about the topics debated within the 
community of constitutional analysts. One professor will insist, 
for example, that the intent of the Framers is the best-perhaps, 
even the only legitimate-source of guidance as to the meaning 
of a given patch of constitutional text; another, contrarily, will 
emphasize the impossibility of ascertaining the intent of long-
dead inhabitants of a fundamentally different political culture 
and that, concomitantly, we should basically look to something 
else-judicial precedents, the best moral and political under-
standings of our own time, etc.-for guidance. And even when a 
judge is wise enough to adopt our own favorite decision-making 
modality ,32 we might still criticize its particular application in a 
given case and indicate, subtly or not, that the nation would be 
far better off were we filling the judicial office instead of the in-
ept author of the opinion in question. 
To some extent, then, most of us self-consciously engage in 
what might be termed attempts, with invariably mixed success in 
terms of our student and other audiences, to legitimate or delegi-
timate particular approaches to, or understandings of, the Consti-
tution. Few of us find it sufficient blandly to convey positivistic 
information about the existence of these approaches or under-
standings and to indicate, without editorial comment, what their 
adherents and adversaries view as their respective strengths and 
weaknesses. 
I believe that our role as (de )legitimators is especially exem-
plified in regard to the purported Twenty-Seventh Amendment. 
To the extent that we present it as in fact an unproblematic addi-
tion to the constitutional text, then it will simply become part of 
our students' consciousness as to what constitutes "the Constitu-
tion." Arguments to the contrary will be unknown to them and, 
indeed, probably incomprehensible. If, on the other hand, we 
denounce the "amendment" as illegitimate, we might well be 
able to prevail, at least with our students and those they go on to 
influence, precisely because there is not now, and may never be, 
a judicial decision to tell them otherwise. To the extent that our 
students are, rightly or wrongly-! believe wrongly-juricentric, 
they might in fact be open to our delegitimation of the "27th 
32. To adopt the language of my colleague Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpreta-
tion 11-22 (Blackwell, 1991). 
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Amendment" in a way that they would never accept similar pro-
fessorial delegitimation of well-established judicial doctrine. In 
any case, I believe that law professors have no alternative but to 
decide self-consciously what they will do in regard to the "27th 
Amendment"; there is, at least at this time, no consensually-
agreed-upon, positivistic "given" that allows us to say that we are 
simply engaging in description when granting the amendment the 
status of "law." 
A recurring debate in literary studies over the past few de-
cades has concerned the claims of certain literary critics that they 
in effect are of equal status as creators of meaning with the poets 
or authors they study. This is distinguished from accepting a 
more limited status as humble servants of the poets and authors 
devoted simply to ascertaining the meanings embedded within 
their works. At least some of the debates about constitutional 
interpretation can be viewed within the same context: Is the law 
professor the servant of a pre-existing constitutional structure or 
in significant ways the creator of those structures? This question, 
of course, can be addressed in regard even to the central subject 
matter of the courses that most of us teach, cases and opinions of 
the United States Supreme Court. Do we teach our students 
that, say, Roe v. Wade or Bowers v. Hardwick is unequivocally 
the "law of the land" simply because the Supreme Court has said 
so, or do we challenge the authority of the Court to issue gener-
ally binding statements of the law? Although I am sympathetic 
with quite sweeping attacks on judicial supremacy and, therefore, 
a delegitimation of any given opinion as being necessarily "the 
law," I recognize that this is an extremely controversial position 
that is, in fact, rejected by most of my colleagues in the academy. 
But I do not see how the law professor can escape the legal-aca-
demic version of the "Heisenberg effect" in regard to the "27th 
Amendment." Whether it will become an unquestioned part of 
the Constitution may well depend on our own willingness to ob-
serve (and then teach) it as such. 
